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Abstract
We study a dynamic pricing problem for a class of products with stable consumption patterns (e.g.,
household items, staple foods). Consumers may stock up the product at current prices for future
consumption, but they incur inventory holding costs. We model this situation as a dynamic game over
an infinite time horizon: in each period, the seller sets a price, and each consumer chooses how many
units to buy. We develop a solution methodology based on rational expectations. By endowing each
player with beliefs, we decouple the dynamic game into individual dynamic programs for each player.
We solve for the rational expectations equilibrium, where all players make optimal dynamic decisions
given correct beliefs about others’ behavior. In equilibrium, the seller may either charge a constant
fixed price or offer periodic price promotions at predictable time intervals. We show that promotions
are useful when frequent shoppers are willing to pay more than occasional shoppers for the product.
We also develop several model extensions to study the impact of consumer stockpiling on the seller’s
inventory, production, and rationing strategies.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study a dynamic pricing problem in the context of consumer goods. Unlike traditional
revenue management settings (e.g., airlines), consumer goods exhibit two important differences. First,
they can be purchased in bulk and inventoried for future use. Second, demand is relatively stable,
so consumers can predict their usage over time. Consequently, stockpiling behavior often arises as a
strategic response to price promotions: when the price is low, consumers will plan ahead and stock up
for future consumption. Such strategic behavior generates new challenges for revenue management of
consumer products. The goal of this paper is to study the seller’s optimal dynamic pricing strategies
and consumers’ optimal stockpiling strategies.
In our model, there is a monopolist selling to a market of consumers over an infinite time
horizon. We formulate a dynamic game between the seller and consumers: during each time period,
the seller sets a price for the product, and consumers choose how many units to buy. The product is
consumed at a steady rate. Consumers may forward buy for future consumption, but they incur in-
ventory holding costs. There is also a fixed cost associated with making any purchase. The population
is heterogeneous, so different types of consumers will make different decisions. We assume that the
seller wishes to maximize long-run average profits and consumers wish to maximize long-run average
utility.
To study this dynamic game, we introduce a methodology based on rational expectations. Our
fundamental premise is that players form expectations over others’ behavior. These expectations allow
us to decouple the dynamic game into dynamic programs for single agents. Given beliefs over consumer
behavior, the seller’s pricing problem becomes a Markov decision process. Similarly, given beliefs over
the seller’s pricing strategy and others’ purchase behavior, each consumer’s inventory problem can
also be decoupled. We introduce the notion of a rational expectations (RE) equilibrium, in which
consumers behave optimally given their beliefs, the seller prices optimally given consumer demand,
and beliefs are consistent with actual outcomes. We demonstrate the existence of a RE equilibrium.
Moreover, using duality theory, we show that an optimal dynamic strategy (or policy) can be mapped
into a cycle of price/inventory states, with transitions through this cycle of states being driven by
optimal pricing and stocking decisions. Based on this graph-theoretic analogy, we show that the RE
equilibrium involves cyclical outcomes. In particular, there will be price cycles that repeat over time.
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Our results provide several managerial insights on pricing strategies for consumer products that
may be stockpiled. First, our model sheds some light on optimal pricing formats. When is it optimal
to offer promotions and when is it preferable to charge “everyday-low-prices”? Interestingly, our model
admits both types of pricing strategies in equilibrium. We show that periodic promotions should be
used when frequent shoppers are willing to pay more for the product, compared to occasional shoppers.
In such cases, promotions are a useful price discrimination device: occasional shoppers stockpile on
promotion and frequent shoppers are willing to pay the regular price during their off-promotion visits.
From the classic Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) model, note that frequent shoppers are likely the
consumers with high holding costs, low fixed costs, and high consumption rates. Therefore, our results
also suggest that promotions are effective for products where consumers with high holding costs (or
low fixed costs or high consumption rates) also have higher valuations for the product. In addition,
we derive comparative results on how the depth and frequency of promotions depend on market
characteristics. Our results also illustrate how consumer stockpiling can generate the “post-promotion
dip” phenomenon: immediately after a promotion, there is a significant slump in quantities sold.
We then study several model extensions and the key findings are summarized here. First, we
consider how consumer stockpiling affects the seller’s inventory strategies. We find that the optimal
inventory policy, in contrast to standard EOQ-type results, may involve different order quantities
at variable time intervals. This observation suggests that stockpiling behavior on the consumer end
can initiate the bullwhip effect in supply chains. Second, we study the seller’s production planning
strategies. We find that the capacitated seller may sometimes need to produce in advance because
consumer stockpiling during promotions can lead to demand spikes. This generates increased inventory
costs and thus makes promotional pricing less attractive. Finally, we consider inventory rationing
strategies (i.e., intentionally limiting quantities sold) and show that they can improve the profitability
of price promotions. This is because the threat of stockouts during promotions may induce consumers
to buy off-promotion at regular prices.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We present a literature review in Section
2. We describe our model in Section 3, and present the problem formulation and technical analysis in
Section 4. This is followed by a numerical study in Section 5. In Section 6, we analyze a special case
that yields explicit solutions and practical insights. In Section 7, we study several model extensions.
Finally, we offer concluding remarks in Section 8. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
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2 Literature Review
Revenue Management
This paper is closely related to the recent stream of literature on optimal dynamic pricing of
finite inventories to strategic customers who form rational expectations of future prices. Representa-
tive papers, each adopting different modeling approaches, include Aviv and Pazgal (2008), Gallego,
Phillips, Sahin (2008), Liu and van Ryzin (2008a), Su (2007), Gallien (2006), Elmaghraby, Gulcu,
Keskinocak (2008), Xu and Hopp (2005), Ovchinnikov and Milner (2005), Levin, McGill, Nediak
(2008), Zhou, Cho, Fan (2005), Yin, Aviv, Pazgal and Tang (2009). The book by Talluri and van
Ryzin (2005) provides a comprehensive survey of the field of revenue management, and the survey by
Shen and Su (2007) reviews emerging work in this area related to strategic purchasing behavior. In
particular, Yin, Aviv, Pazgal and Tang (2009) is the most closely related to the current work. The
authors also utilize the rational expectations approach in their equilibrium analysis. Another closely
related paper is by Liu and van Ryzin (2008b), who show that rational expectations can emerge from
an adaptive learning process. While the papers above consider inventory on the seller side, we focus
on consumer inventory, which drives stockpiling decisions. We adopt a similar modeling approach
and study strategic consumers who are active decision-makers. Through this common paradigm, this
paper introduces consumer stockpiling behavior into the revenue management literature.
Consumer Response to Promotions
There is a large empirical marketing literature that studies consumer response to price promo-
tions. Consistent with consumer stockpiling, during promotions, there should be increases in purchase
quantity as well as duration till the next purchase. Empirical evidence for such “purchase accelera-
tion” is provided by Shoemaker (1979) and Ward and Davis (1978), two of the earliest studies (see
also Blattberg, Eppen and Lieberman, 1981; Neslin, Henderson and Quelch, 1985; Hendel and Nevo,
2006a). Another group of papers, Gupta (1988), Chiang (1991), Chintagunta (1993), and Bell, Chiang
and Padmanabhan (1999), attempt to separate the primary demand effects (brand switching) from
the secondary demand effects (purchase acceleration and stockpiling) of promotions. They do so by
incorporating consumer brand choice decisions. All these studies find that the secondary demand
effect is larger than the primary demand effect. There is another set of papers (see Gonul and Srini-
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vasan, 1996; Erdem, Imai, and Keane, 2003; and Hendel and Nevo, 2006b) that structurally estimate
a dynamic forward-looking model in which consumers form expectations of future prices. Broadly
speaking, these papers demonstrate that consumer expectations have a significant impact on purchase
decisions. These results motivate our rational expectations approach, whereby we posit that consumer
stockpiling is influenced by their future price beliefs.
There are several theoretical models that characterize optimal consumer stockpiling strategies.
In these models, the firms’s prices are exogenously specified. Meyer and Assuncao (1990) study the
consumer’s purchase problem in response to random prices that are i.i.d. over time. Their analysis
is based on Golabi’s (1985) inventory control model, applied to consumer inventories. Krishna (1992)
extend the Golabi model to the case of multiple brands. Assuncao and Meyer (1993) further extend
this line of work by incorporating consumption decisions; they also consider prices that follow a first-
order stochastic process. Krishna (1994) allows for an arbitrary distribution for the inter-arrival time
between deals and characterizes the consumer’s optimal purchasing policy. Ho, Tang, and Bell (1998)
derive the optimal purchasing policy when consumers face fixed shopping costs. They show that under
i.i.d. prices, the consumer’s optimal purchase quantity is linear in the difference between current price
and average price. The papers above assume that the seller’s prices follow an exogenous stochastic
process (e.g., i.i.d. or first-order Markov). Our paper adopts a different approach: we endogenously
derive the seller’s optimal pricing strategies in a rational expectations framework. In fact, we show
that price cycles (significantly different from i.i.d. or first-order Markov prices) emerge in equilibrium.
Optimal Pricing and Consumer Stockpiling
There are only a few papers that study both the seller’s pricing decisions and consumers’
stocking decisions as we do. Blattberg, Eppen, and Lieberman (1981) introduces a model in which the
seller offers periodic promotions to two types of consumers, with low or high holding costs. Low-cost
consumers forward buy during promotions and thus alleviate the seller’s burden of holding inventory,
while high-cost consumers pay the full price. This suggests that offering periodic promotions is an
effective way to transfer inventory carrying costs from the seller to the consumer. In their model, the
seller is assumed to offer periodic promotions; the decision variables are the depth and frequency of
promotions. In contrast, we endogenously derive the optimal temporal price structure and show that
similar promotion patterns will arise in equilibrium.
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In another paper, Jeuland and Narasimhan (1985) also assume that the seller offers periodic
promotions. They also consider two groups of consumers with high or low holding cost, but they
assume that high-cost consumers face a higher demand curve. Since high-cost consumers do not
stockpile, offering promotions effective separately these two groups across time. This illustrates that
periodic promotions serve as a price discrimination device. In our paper, we extend these insights by
considering two additional dimensions of consumer heterogeneity. Apart from different holding costs,
consumers may also have different consumption rates and different fixed shopping costs. We show
that promotions are an effective price discrimination device when consumers with high holding cost,
low fixed costs or high consumption rates also have higher valuations.
Several other papers study the competitive pricing strategies of multiple firms facing consumers
who stockpile. For simplicity, many of these papers assume that consumers may hold at most one unit
of inventory. Salop and Stiglitz (1982) show that consumer stockpiling generates price dispersion in a
mixed strategy equilibrium. During each period, some firms offer discounts to generate additional sales
to consumers who stockpile, while others keep prices high. The equilibrium price distributions involve
only two different prices and are i.i.d. across periods. Bell, Iyer, and Padmanabhan (2002) incorporate
flexible consumption into the Salop and Stiglitz model and obtain similar equilibrium results. Hong,
McAfee, and Nayyar (2002) extend the models of Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1988) by allowing
consumers to carry inventory. They show that equilibrium prices depend on consumer inventories and
thus display negative serial correlation. In a vertical channel setup, Lal, Little and Villas-Boas (1996)
analyze forward buying at the retailer level. There are two manufacturers, one retailer, and “loyals and
switchers” at the consumer level. The authors find that allowing the retailer to forward buy decreases
price competition between manufacturers. However, Anton and Das Varma (2005) obtain different
conclusions when they study forward buying at the consumer level. Using a two-period duopoly model,
they find that strategic stockpiling intensifies competition as firms attempt to capture future market
share from rivals. Guo and Villas-Boas (2007) consider product differentiation using a two-period
Hotelling setup. In their model, high-valuation consumers have a higher propensity to stockpile.
Hence, stockpiling leads to a lower degree of differentiation and more intense price competition in
future periods. In the papers described above, equilibrium prices are either i.i.d. across time or first-
order Markov in a binary state space (since consumer inventory is either zero or one). We add to this
literature by exploring a richer state space and hence a wider class of pricing strategies.
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3 Model
There is a monopolist seller and a mass of consumers in the market. These players interact at discrete
time periods over an infinite horizon. In each period, the seller sets a price for the product, and each
consumer chooses the number of units to purchase. Units that are not consumed immediately may be
inventoried for future use. However, there is an inventory holding cost. For the seller, production cost
is normalized to zero without loss of generality. In this environment, the seller faces a infinite-horizon
dynamic pricing problem, and individual consumers face a infinite-horizon inventory problem.
In our model, we allow for n different consumer types. Let θ ∈ Θ ≡ {1, . . . , n} denote consumer
type. Each consumer type is parameterized by four values, Rθ, vθ,Kθ, hθ, which we describe below.
The consumption rate Rθ denotes the maximum number of units that may be consumed in each period.
The valuation vθ is the positive utility derived from each unit that is consumed. The fixed cost Kθ
is incurred whenever the consumer makes a purchase. The holding cost hθ is the cost of carrying one
unit of the product over one unit of time. Let πθ denote the proportion of type-θ consumers, so these
proportions sum to one over all n types.
Consumer utility depends on three components: purchasing cost, valuation, and holding cost.
Consider a type-θ consumer. First, we consider purchasing cost. Let Dθt denote the number of
units purchased at price pt in period t by the type-θ consumer. Then, the total purchasing cost is
Kθ · 1{Dθt>0} + ptDθt. We assume that all units purchased enter the consumer’s inventory at the start
of the period and thus can be consumed within the same period. Next, we consider consumption. Let
Eθt ∈ [0, Rθ] denote the number of units consumed in period t. Then, this consumer derives positive
consumption utility of vθ · Eθt. We assume that consumption is spread evenly within the period.
Finally, we consider holding cost. Let Iθt denote the number of units held by the type-θ consumer at
the end of period t. Then, the total holding cost for this period is hθ · (Iθt +Eθt/2). Note that the last
term arises due to uniform consumption within the period, so on average, holding cost is incurred on
half the units that were consumed. In summary, the type-θ consumer’s utility accrued in period t is
given by
Uθt = vθ · Eθt −Kθ · 1{Dθt>0} − pt ·Dθt − hθ · (Iθt + Eθt/2). (1)
In each time period t, the following chronology of events occurs.
1. First, the seller sets prices pt.
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2. Then, consumers make purchase decisions. Each type-θ consumer buys Dθt units and the total
demand is Dt ≡
∑n
θ=1 πθDθt.
3. Consumption occurs. Each type-θ consumer chooses the number of units Eθt to consume. Note
that the optimal consumption decisions E∗θt = min{Rθ, Iθ,t−1 + Dθt} are easy to obtain. Since
consumers incur holding costs on leftover units, they prefer immediate consumption over delayed
consumption. Hence, they will always consume whatever is available up to Rθ units.
4. Consumer inventory is updated by adding units purchased and subtracting units consumed,
according to Iθt = Iθ,t−1 +Dθt−Eθt. By the same reasoning above, we have Iθt = [Iθ,t−1 +Dθt−
Rθ]+.
5. The seller accrues profits in this period, as given by Πt = ptDt.
6. Each consumer accrues utility Uθt in this period according to (1) above.
Therefore, over the infinite horizon t = 1, 2, . . ., the seller makes pricing decisions and consumers
make purchase and inventory decisions. We assume that the seller wishes to maximize long-run
average profit Π ≡ limT→∞
PT
t=1 Πt
T and individual consumers seek to maximize long-run average
utility Uθ ≡ limT→∞
PT
t=1 Uθt
T . Although a similar analysis can be conducted using the discounted
profit/utility criteria, we choose to use the long-run average profit/utility criteria in order to facilitate
comparisons with the classical EOQ model, which is based on average cost.
4 General Formulation and Analysis
In this section, we formulate the seller’s pricing problem, consumers’ purchasing problem, and define
our equilibrium concept for this dynamic game.
4.1 Seller’s Problem
The seller’s problem is to determine the optimal price in each period t, which depends on consumers’
on-hand inventory. Let It = {Iθ,t}θ∈Θ denote the vector of on-hand inventories kept by each consumer
type at the end of period t. Then, the optimal pricing strategy is a function P ∗(I) that yields the
optimal price p∗t = P
∗(It−1) in each period t.
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We begin by deriving the seller’s optimal pricing strategy, given his beliefs about consumer
behavior. Suppose the seller believes that the type-θ consumer’s demand function is D̂θ(I, p), and
thus the aggregate demand function is D̂(I, p) ≡
∑n
θ=1 πθD̂θ(I, p). In other words, during period t,
when the vector of consumer inventories carried from the previous period is It−1 and when the price is
pt, the seller believes that type-θ demand will be D̂θt = D̂θ(It−1, pt) and that aggregate demand will
be D̂t = D̂(It−1, pt) =
∑
θ πθD̂θ(It−1, pt). These beliefs D̂θ(I, p) are useful analytically as they allow
us to isolate the seller’s decisions and formulate the pricing problem as a dynamic program.
The seller’s goal is to find the pricing policy P (I) that maximizes the long-run average profit
Π ≡ limT→∞
PT
t=1 Πt
T . This is an average-reward-criterion dynamic programming problem, which can
be formulated as follows: Find λ, g(I) satisfying the Bellman equations
λ + g(I) = max
p
{pD̂(I, p) + g(I′(I, p))} ∀I. (2)
Here, I′(·, ·) is the state transition function. In other words, when the previous inventory state is
It−1 and the price pt is chosen, the seller anticipates that the state will transition to It = I′(It−1, pt)
based on the beliefs about consumer demand D̂(I, p) given above. Specifically, considering each type
separately, we have I ′θ(I, p) = [Iθ + D̂θ(I, p)− Rθ]+. For any pricing policy P (I), we may interpret λ
as the seller’s long-run average revenue under this policy and g(I) as a gain function, which captures
short-term fluctuations from the long-run average when currently at state I. In particular, at the
solution (λ∗, g∗(I)) to (2), we may interpret λ∗ as the seller’s optimal long-run average profit. Further,
at each state I, the maximizer p∗ in the Bellman equation (2) is the optimal price at that state, so
these maximizers collectively yield the desired pricing strategy P ∗(I).
In summary, given beliefs D̂(I, p) about how demand will respond to price p in each inventory
state I, the seller’s optimal pricing policy P ∗(I) can be obtained by solving the dynamic program (2).
4.2 Consumer’s Problem
The consumer’s problem in each period t is to determine how many units to purchase Dθ,t, based on
price pt, on-hand inventory Iθ,t−1, as well as inferences over others’ inventories Î−θ,t−1 (which may
affect future price). We assume that consumers form inferences over the inventories of other types,
based on their beliefs of others’ purchasing behavior (as described below). Hence we may express the
consumer’s optimal purchasing strategy D∗θ(I, p) as a function of inventories I and the price p. In
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the consumer’s problem, we use I = (Iθ, Î−θ) to denote the vector of own inventory and inferences of
others’ inventories. The optimal purchasing strategy yields the optimal quantity D∗θ,t = D
∗
θ(It−1, pt)
in each period t.
As above, we begin by endowing the consumer with beliefs. Suppose all consumers believe that
the seller sets price according to the function P̂ (I). In addition, suppose that type-θ consumers are
believed (by other types) to purchase according to the function D̂θ(I, p). In other words, at the end of
period t, all consumers anticipate the next period’s price to be p̂t+1 = P̂ (It) and that given this price,
type-θ consumers will buy D̂θ,t+1 = D̂θ(It, p̂t+1) units in the next period. Therefore, all consumers
share the same beliefs P̂ (I) over the seller’s actions as well as the same beliefs D̂θ(I, p) and Îθ over the
actions and inventories of other types θ.
Given the beliefs above, the optimal purchasing policy D∗θ(I, p) that maximizes the type-θ
consumer’s long-run average utility Uθ ≡ limT→∞
PT
t=1 Uθ,t
T can be obtained by solving an average-
reward dynamic program. The formulation is as follows: Find µθ, fθ(I, p) satisfying the Bellman
equations
µθ + fθ(I, p) = max
Dθ
{Uθ(Iθ, p,Dθ) + fθ(I′(I, p,Dθ), P ′(I, p,Dθ))} ∀I, p. (3)
Here, similar to (1),
Uθ(Iθ, p,Dθ) = vθ · Eθ(Iθ, Dθ)−Kθ · 1{Dθ>0} − p ·Dθ − hθ · (I
′
θ(Iθ, p,Dθ) + Eθ(Iθ, Dθ)/2) (4)
is the per-period utility function, where Eθ(Iθ, Dθ) = min{Rθ, Iθ + Dθ} is the quantity consumed.
Next, I′(·, ·, ·) and P ′(·, ·, ·) are the state transition functions. In particular, for I′(·, ·, ·), we have
I ′θ(I, p,Dθ) = [Iθ + Dθ − Rθ]+ for type θ and I ′−θ(I, p,Dθ) = [Î−θ + D̂−θ(I, p) − R−θ]+ for other
types. Next, for the other transition function P ′(·, ·, ·), we have P ′(I, p,Dθ) = P̂ (I′(I, p,Dθ)). At the
solution (µ∗, f∗θ (I, p)) to (3), we may interpret µ
∗ as the consumer’s optimal long-run average utility
and f∗θ (I, p) as a gain function, which represents short-term fluctuations from the optimal long-run
average when currently facing inventories I and price p. At each state (I, p), the maximizer D∗θ in the
Bellman equation (3) is the optimal purchase quantity at that state, so these maximizers collectively
yield the desired purchasing strategy D∗θ(I, p).
Here, we have formulated a dynamic program that yields the type-θ consumer’s optimal pur-
chasing policy D∗θ(I, p). This policy is optimal under common beliefs over the seller’s pricing policy
P̂ (I) as well as common beliefs over other types’ purchasing policies D̂−θ(I, p).
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4.3 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
We seek a rational expectations (RE) equilibrium in the game between the seller and the consumers.
The basic requirements of our equilibrium concept is that each player (seller or consumer) forms beliefs
over others’ strategies and optimizes individual payoffs given these beliefs (as described in the previous
subsections), and that these beliefs must be accurate. The definition of our RE equilibrium is provided
next.
Definition 1 A rational expectations (RE) equilibrium consists of a pricing policy P ∗(I) and pur-
chasing policies D∗θ(I, p) satisfying the following three conditions.
1. (Seller optimality) Given beliefs over consumer demand D̂θ(I, p) for each type θ, the seller’s
pricing policy P ∗(I) maximizes long-run average profits Π.
2. (Consumer optimality) Given beliefs over the seller’s pricing policy P̂ (I) and other types’ pur-
chasing policies D̂−θ(I, p), each type-θ consumer’s purchasing policy D∗θ(I, p) maximizes long-run
average utility Uθ.
3. (Dynamic consistency) All beliefs are consistent with outcomes in all states and over all time.
Specifically, P̂ (I) = P ∗(I), D̂(I, p) =
∑n
θ=1 D
∗
θ(I, p), D̂θ(I, p) = D
∗
θ(I, p), and Îθt = Iθt.
Before proceeding, we state two technical assumptions. First, we assume that the seller’s set
of allowable prices is bounded. This is not restrictive since the upper bound can be set as the highest
per-unit consumer valuation without loss of optimality. Second, we assume that consumers may stock
up for at most τ future periods. Again, this assumption is not restrictive since consumers incur holding
costs; then, it is never optimal for the consumer to stock beyond some finite time point in the future.
This assumption can also be interpreted as an expiration date for the product (e.g., perishable items)
or a physical holding capacity (e.g., for bulky consumer products).
The following theorem guarantees the existence of a RE equilibrium in our model.
Theorem 1 There exists an RE equilibrium {P ∗(I);D∗θ(I, p)} satisfying seller optimality, consumer
optimality, and dynamic consistency.
The proof appears in the appendix. The key idea is to consider a static version of the game between the
seller and the consumers, in which the seller makes a one-shot choice of a pricing policy P (I) and the
11
consumers also makes a one-shot choice of purchasing policies Dθ(I, p), and the corresponding payoff
functions are the long-run average payoffs Π and Uθ. Observe that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
in this static game satisfies the conditions for our RE equilibrium defined above. Thus, the proof
proceeds by establishing the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in this static game.
There is another useful structural property of the RE equilibrium. The next theorem indicates
that in any RE equilibrium outcome, there will be price cycles.
Theorem 2
(i) Given any beliefs over consumer demand D̂θ(I, p), the seller’s optimal pricing policy P ∗(I) follows
a cyclic pattern. That is, there are prices {p̃i}mi=1 such that the seller chooses price pt = p̃t mod m
for every t.
(ii) Given any beliefs over the seller’s pricing policy P̂ (I) and other types’ purchasing policies D̂−θ(I, p),
each type-θ consumer’s optimal purchasing policy D∗θ(I, p) generates inventory levels that follow
a cyclic pattern. That is, there are inventory levels {Ĩi}mi=1 such that the inventory level is
It = Ĩt mod m for every t.
(iii) In particular, in any RE equilibrium, the seller’s prices and the consumers’ inventory levels
follow a cyclic pattern.
The proof is presented in the appendix and is based on a graphical argument. Here, we sketch
the basic ideas. The seller’s and consumers’ problems described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, which are
dynamic programs, can be formulated as linear programs. We show that the dual solutions of these
linear programs have a useful interpretation. They correspond to the cyclical trajectory of states that
the system goes through (over time) as the seller sets prices optimally and consumers make purchases
optimally in each period. Consequently, equilibrium outcomes must follow a periodic pattern. As we
traverse the cycle of states, all outcomes (prices and inventory) fluctuate in a predictable manner that
repeats itself over each cycle. The reader is referred to Appendix A for more details.
This result also provides a useful equivalence between dynamic pricing policies P (I) and price
cycles. With the latter interpretation, we may directly calculate the seller’s long-run average revenue
and the consumers’ long-run average utility corresponding to any arbitrary cycle of prices and inven-
tories. Although solving dynamic programming problems is computationally feasible, in some cases,
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it may be analytically more convenient to look for equilibria over price cycles. This approach will be
useful later.
5 Computational Study
The numerical study in this section proceeds as follows. As a starting point, we randomly generate
a variety of hypothetical model scenarios. For each scenario, we computationally characterize the RE
equilibrium using the theoretical results developed in the preceding section. With these results, we
provide insights on how the seller’s optimal pricing strategies may be driven by model input parameters.
Finally, we demonstrate that it is important to recognize consumer stockpiling by contrasting our
computational results to a benchmark in which the seller neglects such behavior.
First, we describe our sample selection procedure. We simulate a total of 2000 model scenarios.
In each model scenario, the seller sells to a market consisting of 4 equal-sized consumer segments. As
described in Section 3, the market size is normalized to 1 and each consumer segment i = 1, . . . , 4 is fully
characterized by the parameters vi, Ri, hi,Ki. The valuation vi is drawn from a normal distribution
with mean $5.00 and standard deviation $1.00. The per-period consumption rate Ri is either 1 unit
(with probability 0.75) or 2 units (with probability 0.25). The per-period, per-unit holding cost hi
and the fixed cost Ki are both exponentially distributed with means $1.50 and $3.00 respectively. All
random realizations above are independent across consumer segments and across scenarios. To simplify
the state and action spaces, we assume that the seller charges integral unit prices and consumers
purchase units in integral quantities.
Next, we describe how we compute the RE equilibrium for each model scenario. As explained
in Section 4.3, the RE equilibrium can be viewed as a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the space of
dynamic policies. That is, each player’s equilibrium strategy must be a best response to the dynamic
policies adopted by all other players. We compute the equilibrium using the alternating-move Cournot
adjustment process, which is an iterative algorithm used to compute Nash equilibria in games (see
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991). At each step in this process, one of the players (i.e., the seller or consumer
segments 1, 2, 3, or 4, in turn) updates his current strategy to the optimal policy in response to current
choices of other players (i.e, current beliefs). Each updating step requires us to solve either the dynamic
program (2) for the seller or (3) for the consumer; we employ the value iteration algorithm here (see
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Puterman, 1994). The computational procedure described above does not converge in 108 (i.e., 5.4%)
of our simulated scenarios. Therefore, in our analysis below, we are left with a sample size of N = 1892
scenarios.
For each scenario, we are interested in the following quantities as they shed some light on the
structure of the seller’s optimal pricing policy: (i) the seller’s average price in each period, (ii) the
standard deviation of prices over each price cycle, (iii) the number of different prices offered, (iv) the
price range, (v) the length of each price cycle, and (vi) the length of each cycle of inventory states.
Note that when the seller charges a single fixed price, the standard deviation and price range are both
zero, and each price “cycle” has length 1. However, the inventory-state cycle is generally longer than
the price cycle because the former may have length exceeding 1 as a result of consumer stockpiling,
even when the seller charges a fixed price. Finally, for each simulated scenario, we are also interested
in the seller’s average profit per period. Table 1 provides summary statistics of the above quantities
of interest, displaying the mean, standard deviation, and range of each quantity over our sample of
observations.
Table 1: Summary statistics for our sample of observations.
What are some key market characteristics that shape the structure of the seller’s optimal pric-
ing strategy? For example, under what market conditions should the seller charge higher average prices
or more variable prices? When should the seller charge a fixed price? What factors influence the price
range and the length of the price cycle? We shall address these questions using our computational
results. In our sample, there is a large number of variables (i.e., 4 simulated parameters, vi, Ri, hi,Ki,
for each of the 4 consumer segments). From this pool of variables, we identify potential predictors that
might be of practical significance. For example, for each consumer attribute (e.g., the vector of fixed
costs (K1,K2,K3,K4) for the 4 consumer segments), we consider the mean, standard deviation, and
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range as possible predictors. Another set of potential predictors are correlations between each pair
of consumer attributes. Having identified these potential predictors, we proceed to look for system-
atic relationships between them and the quantities of interest described in the preceding paragraph.
Treating each quantity of interest (e.g., length of each price cycle) as a separate response variable,
we run a simple linear regression with our predictors above. (For binary response variables, we fit a
logistic regression model instead.) The results are summarized in Table 2. Each column represents a
separate regression, and significant coefficients suggest a systematic relationship.
Table 2: Regression results. Each column displays the estimated coefficients of a separate regression
model. The dependent variable is shown at the top of the column, and independent variables are
displayed on the leftmost column. Statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels are respectively
marked by * and **.
We highlight three key observations.
1. The first two columns of Table 2 identify the main factors affecting the seller’s profit and average
prices. Our results show that profits and prices generally depend on the means of all four
consumer attributes. Specifically, prices and profits are higher as average valuations increase
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(since the coefficients 0.8531 and 0.76 are positive and significant), as average consumption rates
increase, as average holding costs decrease, and as average fixed costs decrease. These effects
match our intuition. Furthermore, note that prices and profits also depend heavily on each
pairwise correlation between consumer attributes.
2. The next three columns study various measures of price variation: standard deviation of prices,
number of unique prices offered, and whether the seller prefers variable over fixed pricing. Our
results suggest that consumer fixed costs have a large role to play. In our sample, optimal prices
appear to be more variable as average fixed costs increase (note that the coefficients 0.0517,
0.0803, 0.4054 are all highly significant and positive). In addition, our results also show that
variable pricing becomes more attractive as consumer valuations and fixed costs become more
negatively correlated (coefficient of -0.4478), as consumption rates and holding costs become
more positively correlated (coefficient of 0.7264), and as holding costs and fixed costs become
more negatively correlated (coefficient of -0.314).
3. The final two columns present regression results using a restricted sample consisting only of
observations in which the seller uses variable pricing. We are interested in asking: when the
seller varies prices over time, what factors affect the depth of discounts (reflected in the price
range) and the time intervals between them (i.e., the price cycle length)? Our results suggest
that these are more elusive questions. Compared to before, these regression models appear to
have a smaller number of significant coefficients. The only predictor that is significant for both
columns is the correlation between consumer valuations and fixed costs. As this correlation
becomes more positive, our results suggest that the seller should offer smaller discounts (since
−0.129 < 0) that are spaced between larger time intervals (since 0.8657 > 0).
For the remainder of our numerical study, we estimate the benefits of using our model by
comparing results against a benchmark. In this benchmark, the seller ignores consumer stockpiling
and assumes that consumers make purchases every period as long as the price is sufficiently attrac-
tive. Thus, the seller’s problem reduces to a standard monopoly pricing problem: the lower the price,
the more consumers will buy. For each sample observation, given the randomly generated consumer
attributes, we calculate the seller’s preferred price and his corresponding profit when he ignores stock-
piling. Since the seller fails to consider dynamic pricing, his profit will be lower in our benchmark
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calculations. For each of our sample observations, we compute the percentage profit loss that the seller
suffers when he neglects consumer stockpiling. This percentage difference can be interpreted as the
benefit of using our model.
It is instructive to divide our sample observations into three categories and consider the benefits
of our model for each of them. In the first category, the RE equilibrium involves a fixed price and no
consumers stockpile. Observe that in these instances, the seller loses nothing by ignoring consumer
stockpiling since it does not arise in equilibrium anyway. In the second category, the RE equilibrium
involves a fixed price but some consumers do stockpile. For such cases, stockpiling allows consumers
to exploit scale economies and reduce costs. When the seller fails to recognize this fact, he may
underestimate willingness-to-pay and end up with a suboptimal price. (Certainly, there may also
be scenarios in which the seller correctly chooses the optimal price even when he neglects consumer
stockpiling.) Finally, in our third category of model scenarios, the seller’s prices vary dynamically and
some consumers stockpile. In these cases, our model is used to derive the optimal price cycle, so the
seller may suffer some losses when he ignores consumer stockpiling.
Table 3 presents statistics summarizing the seller’s percentage profit loss as a result of neglecting
consumer stockpiling. The results are shown for each of the three category of observations and also for
the entire sample. Note that each of the three categories, i.e., fixed-pricing-without-stockpiling, fixed-
pricing-with-stockpiling, and variable-pricing-with-stockpiling, arises with frequencies 22%, 57%, and
21% respectively. For each category of observations (on separate rows), we show the average percentage
loss as well as the standard deviation and the median. We also present these statistics for the subset
of observations in which adopting our model yields a positive gain (i.e., the seller’s profit is strictly
lower when he ignores consumer stockpiling).
Table 3: Seller’s percentage profit loss as a result of neglecting consumer stockpiling.
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We draw three conclusions from these results.
1. In our sample, more than half of the observations involve a fixed price and consumer stockpiling.
For these cases, the median profit loss from ignoring consumer stockpiling is zero, implying
that very often, the seller can correctly obtain the optimal price without the aid of our model.
Nevertheless, when our model does matter, the seller’s percentage loss averages 35.67% and
exceeds one-third about half the time. These are rather significant proportions.
2. Next, consider the subset of observations in which the optimal pricing policy is cyclic and con-
sumers stockpile. In these cases, when the seller neglects consumer stockpiling, the percentage
losses have a mean of 15.14% and a standard deviation of 16.09%. Also, the seller’s loss exceeds
10% about half the time.
3. Finally, considering the entire sample of observations, our results show that the seller who ignores
consumer stockpiling may lose about 11.46% of his profits (on average). Note that the standard
deviation of 18.71% is rather high because there is a sizable mass point at 0 (since our model,
admittedly, makes no difference for a significant proportion of the observations, e.g., when there
is no stockpiling in equilibrium).
6 Practical Implications
In order to derive additional insights, we now consider a special case with two types of consumers. This
special case of our model can be solved analytically. We characterize the RE equilibrium explicitly
below. Then, we discuss practical implications of our results. Specifically, we: (i) discuss factors
influencing the optimal choice of pricing formats, (ii) study how the frequency and depth of discounts
depend on model parameters, and (iii) describe how equilibrium sales and inventory levels evolve over
time.
We begin with some notation and terminology for the two-type special case. For each consumer
type θ, it follows from the standard EOQ model that under constant prices, the consumer wishes to
make purchases every Tθ periods, where Tθ =
√
2Kθ
hθRθ
. We can interpret Tθ as the natural shopping
frequency, which minimizes holding and fixed costs, when prices are constant. This motivates the
following terminology for our two-type model. We shall refer to our two types as frequent shoppers
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and occasional shoppers, where the former shops more frequently under constant prices, i.e. Tf =√
2Kf
hf Rf
<
√
2Ko
hoRo
= To. Without loss of generality, we normalize time units so that Tf ≡ 1. In other
words, the length of one time period in our discrete-time model can be interpreted as the natural
shopping frequency of frequent shoppers; under constant prices, they visit the seller every period.
Similarly, we assume that the natural shopping frequency of occasional shoppers is a positive integer,
i.e. To ∈ Z+. In other words, while frequent shoppers prefer to shop every period, occasional shoppers
prefer to shop every To periods, given constant prices.
Next, we characterize the willingness-to-pay of each consumer type. For each consumer type
θ ∈ {f, o}, recall from the EOQ model that the optimal (lowest) shopping cost is
√
2hθKθRθ per unit
time, which is equivalent to
√
2hθKθ
Rθ
per unit. (Note that this lowest cost is achieved only at the
optimal shopping frequency.) Since per-unit valuation is vθ, each type-θ consumer will never pay more
than vθ −
√
2hθKθ
Rθ
for each unit of the product. We introduce the notation
WTPf ≡ vf −
√
2hfKf
Rf
,
WTPo ≡ vo −
√
2hoKo
Ro
,
for the willingness-to-pay of frequent and occasional shoppers, respectively. Further, we denote
WTPL ≡ min{WTPf ,WTPo}, WTPH ≡ max{WTPf ,WTPo}, and ∆ ≡ WTPH −WTPL.
Now, we are ready to characterize the RE equilibrium outcomes. Depending on model pa-
rameters, there are three possible types of equilibrium. We call them everyday-low-price (EDLP),
everyday-high-price (EDHP), and promotional pricing (HILO). Under EDLP and EDHP, the seller
sets a constant price at WTPL and WTPH respectively. Under HILO, the regular price is WTPH
and a sale price of WTPL is offered periodically (i.e., the discount is ∆). The following proposition
characterizes conditions under which each type of equilibrium arises.
Proposition 1 (i) Suppose WTPf > WTPo. Then, only HILO or EDHP may arise in equilibrium.
• Under HILO, the low price WTPo is offered once every To periods and the high price WTPf
is offered in other periods. Occasional shoppers buy only on sale, i.e., once every To periods.
Frequent shoppers stock up for min{∆/hf , (To− 1)} future periods when there is a sale and after
this inventory runs out, they shop every period until the next sale.
• Under EDHP, the seller charges WTPf every period and only frequent shoppers buy.
19
(ii) Suppose WTPo > WTPf . Then, only EDLP or EDHP may arise in equilibrium.
• Under EDLP, the seller charges WTPf every period. Frequent shoppers buy every period and
occasional shoppers buy once every To periods.
• Under EDHP, the seller charges WTPo every period. Only occasional shoppers buy and they
shop once every To periods.
The proof is provided in the appendix. In the next few subsections, we shall proceed to discuss the
practical implications of our equilibrium results in Proposition 1.
6.1 Optimal Pricing Format
We first discuss the seller’s choice of an optimal pricing format. In practice, periodic promotions
(HILO) and constant prices (EDLP or EDHP) are both viable pricing formats. Within the boundary
of our model, our results may offer some insight on when each pricing format is preferred. In fact,
Proposition 1 clearly states that price promotions should be used only when frequent shoppers have a
higher willingness-to-pay. Otherwise, it is optimal for the seller to offer fixed prices.
Intuitively, the “frequent shoppers spend more” condition implies that periodic promotions are
an effective price discrimination device. By definition, occasional shoppers shop less frequently and
thus they are likely to stock up for longer time horizons during promotions. On the other hand, frequent
shoppers continue to visit the store even when there is no promotion. When frequent shoppers have
a higher willingness-to-pay, the seller can then extract their entire surplus during these off-promotion
visits, without losing sales to occasional shoppers (who have stocked up during promotions). Therefore,
strategic stockpiling by occasional shoppers enables the seller to price discriminate and charge a higher
off-promotion price to frequent shoppers.
When is this “frequent shoppers spend more” condition more likely to hold? Clearly, as frequent
shoppers’ valuation vf increases, this condition is more likely to hold. Recall that frequent shoppers
are so defined because their optimal shopping interval Tf =
√
2Kf
hf Rf
is short. In practice, consumers
with high holding costs h, high consumption rates R, and low fixed costs K are likely to be frequent
shoppers. If these consumers also have high valuations, the “frequent shoppers spend more” condition
is more likely to hold, and price promotions thus become more attractive for the seller. We state this
result as a corollary to Proposition 1.
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Corollary 1 Suppose the seller wishes to sell to both consumer segments. Then, all else equal, pro-
motional pricing is the optimal pricing format when:
(i) consumers with higher holding costs have sufficiently high valuations,
(ii) consumers with higher consumption rates have sufficiently high valuations,
(iii) consumers with lower fixed costs have sufficiently high valuations.
In practice, our model parameters h, K,R are closely related to demographic factors. For many
household products (e.g., detergent), consumption rates R depend heavily on household size; hence,
Corollary 1 suggests that promotions are preferred when larger households (with higher R) have higher
valuations. In fact, even when all consumers have the same valuation (i.e., vf = vo), heterogeneity in
consumption rates alone (i.e., Rf > Ro but Kf = Ko, hf = ho) already implies that price promotions
are optimal (since it follows that frequent shoppers have a higher willingness to pay). Next, note that
holding costs h are influenced by income (when we consider financial holding cost) as well as house
size (a larger house stores more products), especially for relatively heavy or bulky items (e.g., bottled
water). In the case of canned or frozen foods, if high-holding-cost consumers (from lower income
households or with smaller homes) have higher valuations, then Corollary 1 suggests that promotions
are optimal. Finally, fixed shopping costs K are often incurred through traveling to the store and are
thus related to consumers’ location relative to the store. For a particular seller, Corollary 1 suggests
that promotions are optimal when the consumers living close-by (with low K) have higher valuations.
Note that our specialized model in this subsection does have some limitations. We have assumed
that the natural shopping frequencies To and Tf = 1 are integers, so the difference between consumer
types must be rather significant for To > Tf to hold. (For example, Ko must be at least 4 times as large
as Kf , if all other parameters are the same between the two types.) Nevertheless, the numerical results
of the previous section suggest that our conclusions do extend to more general cases. For example,
Table 2 shows that the seller is more likely to prefer the HILO pricing format over fixed prices as
the correlation between consumer valuations and fixed costs becomes more negative (i.e., significant
coefficient of -0.4478); this is in agreement with our finding in Corollary 1(iii) above. Similarly, the
other two coefficients corresponding to Corollary 1(i) and (ii) appear to have the correct sign (i.e.,
0.0533 and 0.0555), although they are not statistically significant.
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6.2 Frequency and Depth of Promotions
The previous subsection examines factors that influence the seller’s optimal choice of pricing formats.
Here, focussing on situations where the seller prefers promotional pricing, we study how the optimal
frequency and depth of promotions vary with market characteristics.
Recall from Proposition 1 that under HILO pricing, the optimal discount (depth of promotion)
is ∆ = WTPf −WTPo and the optimal time interval between promotions (frequency of promotions)
is To, as given below:
∆ = (vf − vo) +
√
2hoKo
Ro
−
√
2hfKf
Rf
,
To =
√
2Ko
hoRo
.
It is natural to ask how these quantities of interest vary with consumer attributes along all three dimen-
sions: holding cost, fixed cost, and consumption rate. In particular, as consumer attributes become
more dispersed along each dimension (in the sense of a mean-preserving spread), how do the optimal
promotional depth and frequency change? Our results below provide guidance for sellers operating in
different markets, in which customers are primarily differentiated along different dimensions.
Proposition 2
(i) Suppose consumer holding costs go through a mean-preserving spread (i.e., hf increases and ho
decreases). Then, the seller should offer smaller discounts and do so less frequently.
(ii) Suppose consumer fixed costs go through a mean-preserving spread (i.e., Kf decreases and Ko
increases). Then, the seller should offer larger discounts and do so less frequently.
(iii) Suppose consumption rates go through a mean-preserving spread (i.e., Rf increases and Ro de-
creases). Then, the seller should offer larger discounts and do so less frequently.
In summary, Proposition 2 indicates that a mean-preserving spread along any of the three di-
mensions will induce the seller to offer less frequent promotions. However, its impact on the magnitude
of the discount is less clear cut. We find that mean-preserving spreads in consumption rates and in
fixed costs both lead to deeper discounts. In contrast, a mean-preserving spread in holding costs leads
to smaller discounts because an increase in hf and a decrease in ho will hamper the seller’s ability to
price discriminate against the frequent shoppers.
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6.3 Inventory and Sales
So far, we have focused mainly on price outcomes, i.e., how prices should be adjusted over time. Now
we turn attention to other measure of interest, such as quantities that are sold over time and consumer
inventory levels over time. As above, we focus on the case where the RE equilibrium involves price
promotions.
Figure 1: Inventory levels of frequent shoppers (solid line) and occasional shoppers (dashed line) over
time.
Figure 1 shows an example of how consumer inventory levels fluctuate over time when the
seller uses promotional pricing. In this example, promotions occur once every five periods. Occasional
shoppers (represented by the dashed line) buy only on promotion and they stock up for consumption
over all five periods. Frequent shoppers (represented by the solid line), on the other hand, stockpile
for three periods when there is a promotion. Consequently, over the next two periods following the
promotion, they do not visit the seller. In the fourth and fifth periods, frequent shoppers make
purchases because they have run out of inventory. This cycle repeats itself every five periods.
Notice that periodic promotions induces inefficient stockpiling by the frequent shoppers. Their
optimal shopping frequency (which minimizes shopping costs) is once every period, but instead, they
choose to stock up during promotions and incur additional costs. Such stockpiling inefficiencies do
not arise when the seller charges a fixed price. Under a fixed price, all consumers buy at their natural
shopping frequency, which minimizes shopping costs.
Next, we look at how sales quantities fluctuate over time under promotional pricing. For the
same example above, Figure 2 plots the quantities sold in each period over the price cycle. The figure
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clearly demonstrates a phenomenon known as the post-promotional dip. Following the surge of sales
at the start of the price cycle (in response to the attractive promotional price), there is an interval
with no sales. During this time, consumers are comfortably stocked up and they have no incentive
to buy. Toward the end of each price cycle, sales start to trickle in but only from frequent shoppers.
At the next promotion, this cycle repeats itself. This type of sales pattern, characterized by a surge
followed by zero and then mild sales within each price cycle, arises only under promotional pricing,
strategic stockpiling, and consumer heterogeneity. All three elements are essential to generate the
post-promotion dip.
Figure 2: Quantities sold over time.
7 Extensions
Now, we turn to several extensions of our model. In these extensions, we study how consumer stock-
piling and the seller’s pricing decisions interact with other supply-side strategies. In particular, we
examine the seller’s inventory, production, and rationing strategies.
7.1 Inventory management
In the basic analysis, we have assumed that the seller does not carry any inventory. For example, the
seller may be a retailer who procures just enough units to meet consumer demand in every period.
However, in practice, retailers often place orders in batches, as there may be economies of scale due
to fixed ordering costs. In such cases, the seller needs to hold inventory between consecutive orders
in order to satisfy demand before the next order arrives. How should the seller manage inventory
24
in the presence of consumer stockpiling? How do these inventory decisions interact with the pricing
strategies studied above? We shall develop a model extension to address these questions.
In this extension, similar to the EOQ model, the seller incurs a fixed ordering cost of Ks and
a per-unit inventory holding cost of hs in every period. Let M denote the total number of consumers
(i.e., market size). We build up on the two-type model introduced in Section 6. Recall that we have
occasional and frequent shoppers with natural shopping intervals of To and Tf respectively, and the
seller may choose between EDHP, EDLP, or HILO pricing strategies. Each of these pricing strategies
generate different demand patterns. Our goal is to understand how the seller can minimize inventory-
related costs while maintaining the required stock on hand to fulfill demand under each of the above
classes of pricing strategies.
First, we consider the EDHP pricing strategies (i.e., the seller sells only to a single type of
consumers). When the seller sells only to frequent shoppers, we have our basic EOQ model, which
serves as a useful benchmark. The demand rate from frequent shoppers is MπfRf . Therefore, the
seller’s optimal cycle length is T ∗s =
√
2Ks
hs·Mπf Rf . In other words, the seller places an order once every
T ∗s periods and sells to frequent shoppers at a constant rate over the entire order cycle. Next, the
other alternative under EDHP is that the seller may sell only to occasional shoppers, who stock up
once every To periods. In this case, when the seller orders precisely at these time intervals, he incurs
no inventory cost because the entire stock is transferred to consumers at the start of each cycle.
Now, we consider the EDLP and HILO strategies (i.e., the seller sells to both consumer types).
In these cases, the pricing strategies generate complex demand patterns that repeat every To periods.
• Under EDLP, the seller sells MπoRoTo units to occasional shoppers (who stock up) once every
To periods, plus an additional MπfRf units to frequent shoppers every period. In other words,
the demand pattern is MπfRf units every period, except at the start of the cycle when the
demand is MπoRoTo + MπfRf units.
• Under HILO, occasional shoppers stock up for the entire cycle length of To periods but frequent
shoppers stock up for a shorter time. Let S denote the length of time at the end of each
cycle when frequent shoppers visit the seller. Then, the demand at the start of each cycle is
MπoRoTo + MπfRf (To − S) units, and the demand at each of the final S periods is MπfRf
units. In between, the seller faces zero demand since consumers are all comfortably stocked up.
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How should the seller manage inventory so that he has sufficient stock to fulfill the demand patterns
described above? For each cycle of To periods, we find the inventory policy that minimizes cost while
sustaining sales to consumers. Our results are summarized below.
Proposition 3 Let Ts =
√
2Ks
hs·Mπf Rf .
(i) Under EDLP, the seller should divide each cycle of To periods into N segments whose lengths
τ1, τ2, . . . , τN differ by at most one. At the start of each i-th segment, the seller places an order
to fulfill all demand that arrives within that segment. Therefore, the seller orders MπoRoTo +
MπfRfτ1 units for the first segment and MπfRfτi units for each remaining segment, where
i = 2, . . . , N . The possible candidates for N are the two integers closest to To/Ts.
(ii) Under HILO, the seller places an order at the start of each cycle. In addition, the seller should
divide the final S periods into N segments whose lengths τ1, τ2, . . . , τN differ by at most one, and
place an order at the start of each segment. Therefore, the seller orders MπoRoTo+MπfRf (To−∑N
i=1 τi) units at the start of the cycle and MπfRfτi units for each remaining segment, where
i = 1, . . . , N . The possible candidates for N are zero and the two integers closest to S/Ts.
This result highlights some major effects of consumer stockpiling on the seller’s inventory
strategies. First and foremost, when the seller sells to heterogeneous consumers with a propensity to
stockpile, we show that the optimal inventory policy may involve different order quantities at possibly
variable time intervals. In contrast, the basic EOQ model (which neglects consumer stockpiling)
recommends placing equal-sized orders at regular intervals. We find that sellers may need to use
a combination of jumbo orders (to fulfill demand from stockpiling consumers) as well as additional
smaller regular orders. In addition, under HILO strategies, there may be a longer time lag after placing
a jumbo order before placing the next (regular) order. However, such a lag is not necessary under
EDLP pricing as all orders are still placed at regular intervals.
Another finding is that the optimal policy parameters depend heavily on the demand from
frequent shoppers. Note that Ts =
√
2Ks
hs·Mπf Rf , which is based on frequent shopper demand, plays a
key role in the results of Proposition 3. Our model suggests that market studies focusing on aggregate
demand may not be sufficient. For inventory management purposes, it is also important to estimate
consumer stockpiling tendencies in order to distill the demand rates of frequent shoppers.
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Finally, our results suggest that consumer stockpiling can generate the well-known bullwhip
effect, even in EDLP environments. As shown in Proposition 3, every-day-low-pricing does not elimi-
nate consumer stockpiling, and the seller will find it optimal to place a jumbo order once in a while.
These jumbo orders introduce variability that may propagate upwards along the supply chain. While
price stability can help to control demand fluctuations, our model cautions that stockpiling on the
consumer end can continue to inject variability into the system.
7.2 Production planning
Now, we consider the seller’s production planning strategies. In the basic analysis, we have implicitly
assumed that the seller can instantaneously produce enough units to meet demand in each period.
However, in practice, the seller may face capacity constraints. For example, during a promotion, the
seller may not be able to produce enough units in the same period to meet all the demand. In such
cases, the seller may need to build up and carry inventory into the promotional period. As a result,
the seller incurs inventory holding costs, which may influence his choice of a pricing strategy.
Here, we continue to employ the two-type model analyzed in Section 6. Recall that when
frequent shoppers are willing to pay more, the seller chooses between HILO and EDHP, but in the
reverse case, the seller chooses between EDLP and EDHP. Here, we shall study how limited production
capacity and inventory holding costs will influence the seller’s choice between the two possible pricing
formats in each case. We shall assume that the production capacity is large enough, so that it is
feasible for the seller to fulfill total demand over the entire time horizon, although advance production
may be necessary.
Let Π(EDLP ),Π(EDHP ),Π(HILO) denote the seller’s long-run average profit under each
pricing format. We have the following result.
Proposition 4
(i) Suppose WTPf > WTPo (i.e., the seller chooses between HILO and EDHP). With limited
production capacity, the value of Π(EDHP )−Π(HILO) is increased.
(ii) Suppose WTPo > WTPf (i.e., the seller chooses between EDLP and EDHP). With limited
production capacity, the value of Π(EDHP )−Π(EDLP ) is increased.
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This result indicates that the seller is more inclined to choose EDHP when there is limited
production capacity. Intuitively, as a result of stockpiling behavior, selling to all consumers (via either
EDLP or HILO) involves periodic demand surges. To fulfill these periodic surges of high demand (e.g.,
in the case of HILO, when there is a promotion), the seller may need to build up inventory, which
incurs holding costs. Figure 3 shows an example of the capacitated seller’s inventory process under
HILO (dashed line) and under EDHP (solid line); holding costs are clearly higher in the former case.
As the capacity constraint becomes tighter, the seller has to begin production earlier and thus incurs
higher holding costs. It may even be worthwhile for the seller to reduce holding costs by offering
smaller and/or more frequent discounts so that the periodic demand surges become smaller. As long
as there is limited production capacity, our results suggest that the seller will have an incentive to
discourage consumer stockpiling.
Figure 3: Seller’s inventory level with production capacity constraint, under HILO (dashed line) and
EDHP (solid line).
7.3 Rationing strategies
In this extension, we consider the possibility that the seller may use inventory rationing to discourage
strategic consumer stockpiling. In some situations, it may be profitable for the seller to withhold
inventory and fulfill only a portion of available demand. We focus on rationing during price promotions
(HILO), since it is clearly suboptimal to do so when the seller charges a fixed price. By limiting
availability during a promotion, the seller encourages consumers to buy off-promotion and thus may
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improve profits.
Suppose the seller has a finite amount of inventory to sell during a promotional period. Within
this period, units are initially offered at the regular price and any remaining units are then put on sale
(cf. Liu and van Ryzin, 2008a, 2008b). Consumers who wait for the sale price may find the product
sold out. Note that consumers know when promotions will occur, but they do not know whether they
will find the product available on sale. Since there is a fixed shopping cost, some consumers may
opt to buy at the regular price and forego the chance of obtaining the product on promotion. Let ρ
denote the probability that the product is available at the promotional price. In equilibrium, the seller
can realize this probability by making the corresponding quantity available; that is, if the equilibrium
demand during the promotional period is Dregular and Dpromotion at the regular and promotional
price, the seller stocks Dregular + ρDpromotion units, so that after the regular-priced units are sold, the
availability probability is indeed ρ. Here, we assume proportional rationing; i.e., all consumers have
equal access to the product.
The following proposition shows that promotional pricing becomes more attractive when we
allow inventory rationing. Recall from Proposition 1(i) that when frequent shoppers have a higher
willingness-to-pay, the seller chooses between HILO and EDHP pricing formats. Now, if rationing is
allowed, the seller always prefers HILO.
Proposition 5 Suppose WTPf > WTPo. If inventory rationing is allowed, the seller always uses
HILO. The regular price is WTPf and the promotional price of WTPo is offered once every To periods
but only with an availability probability of ρ. The two possible candidates for this probability are ρ = 1
(i.e., no rationing) and ρ = ρ̃ < 1, where ρ̃ ≡ 1
/(
1 + ∆hf
)2
. The latter is preferred if the proportion
of occasional shoppers πo is sufficiently small.
The intuition for the inventory rationing strategy proceeds as follows. The candidate availability
probability ρ̃ obtained above is the cutoff probability below which frequent shoppers will prefer to buy
at the regular price rather than wait for the discount and take the chance of not getting the product.
Under this probability ρ̃, frequent shoppers always buy at the regular (high) price. Consequently, this
inventory rationing strategy strictly dominates EDHP because, apart from regular sales to frequent
shoppers, there are also promotional sales to occasional shoppers. Therefore, the seller always uses
HILO and chooses between rationing (i.e., ρ = ρ̃) and no-rationing (i.e., ρ = 1). Here, the tradeoff
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is that under rationing, some sales are lost when occasional shoppers are rationed, but doing so is
essential to induce frequent shoppers to buy at the regular price. Therefore, inventory rationing is
viable when the proportion of occasional shoppers is small.
This discussion shows that inventory rationing increases the profitability of price promotions.
While periodic promotions allow the seller to practice inter-temporal price discrimination (i.e., across
time periods), inventory rationing additionally allows for price discrimination within a time period.
In practice, some retailers offer “while supplies last” promotions. At these promotions, although
prices are low, demand is not completely satisfied. Our results suggest that these promotions cater to
occasional shoppers with a relative low willingness-to-pay.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the monopolist seller’s inter-temporal pricing problem when consumers strate-
gically stockpile for future consumption. We develop a solution methodology based on rational expec-
tations, and use it to provide a graphical interpretation of dynamic pricing policies in terms of cycles
in a directed graph. With this result, we show that the equilibrium may involve either fixed prices or
periodic promotions. Our findings shed light on the optimal choice of pricing formats. Specifically,
we show that periodic promotions are preferred when frequent shoppers are willing to pay more than
occasional shoppers for the product. We also use several model extensions to study the interaction
between consumer stockpiling and the seller’s inventory, production, and rationing strategies.
There are several limitations in this study that present additional research opportunities. First,
we have assumed an exogenous consumption rate for each consumer. For some product categories,
consumption is flexible and individuals may consume more when the price is low (see Ailawadi and
Neslin, 1998, and Bell, Iyer, and Padmanabhan, 2002). It would be useful to understand the effect
of flexible consumption on equilibrium pricing strategies studied here. Second, we have also assumed
that the seller charges a fixed price for every unit. It is conceivable that nonlinear pricing may
be used to influence stockpiling behavior. Then, should quantity discounts be offered, and if so,
when? Third, this analysis is also relevant in a supply chain setting. Instead of end-consumers,
downstream buyers in a supply chain may also stockpile when they anticipate price fluctuations. This
scenario is more complex because downstream buyers do not “consume” the products at a steady rate.
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Instead, downstream buyers (e.g., retailers) sell to end-consumers who may also stockpile the product
themselves. It is interesting to study optimal stockpiling strategies, in response to price fluctuations,
at different locations along the supply chain. This brings us to our final suggested research direction:
the current analysis can be extended to a competitive setting. An oligopoly counter-part to the present
analysis serves to verify the robustness of our results. The models by Salop and Stiglitz (1982) and
Pesendorfer (2002) may provide useful starting points. We conjecture that with multiple sellers, the
equilibrium involves mixed strategies and randomized sales.
Appendix A: Graphical interpretation of equilibrium strategies
In this appendix, we provide an alternative linear programming formulation of the underlying Markov
decision processes in our model. These alternative formulations yield an intuitive graphical interpre-
tation of the equilibrium strategies.
Consider the seller’s problem in Section 4.1. There is an alternative formulation of the dynamic
programming problem in terms of a linear program. We call this the primal problem.
minλ,g(I) λ (5)
such that λ + g(I) ≥ pD̂(I, p) + g(I′(I, p)) ∀I, p. (6)
It is well-known that the solution to the primal problem also satisfies the Bellman equations (2). At
this point, it is convenient to write down the dual of the above linear program. We call this the dual
problem.
maxx(I,p)
∑
I
∑
p
pD̂(I, p)x(I, p) (7)
such that
∑
p
x(I, p)−
∑
{(I0,p0): I′(I0,p0)=I}
x(I0, p0) = 0 ∀I, (8)∑
I
∑
p
x(I, p) = 1, (9)
x(I, p) ≥ 0 ∀I, p. (10)
The dual problem has a useful and intuitive representation. Let us visualize a directed graph
G where each node represents a particular inventory state I and each edge represents a transition out
of state I as a result of applying price p in that state. Thus, each dual variable x(I, p) is associated
with a particular directed edge in this graph. The dual problem is to find a distribution of positive
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weights x(I, p), summing to one, over all edges, so that the objective (7) is maximized. Notice that
the constraint (8) is a flow balance condition: the sum of all weights flowing out each state I, which
is the first summation, must equal the sum of all weights flowing in, which is the second summation.
The following result states that the optimal dual solution can be viewed as a cycle of states in the
graph G.
Lemma 1 There exists an optimal solution to the dual problem x∗(I, p) such that the edges corre-
sponding to all (I, p) for which x∗(I, p) > 0 form a cycle. Further, all such strictly positive dual
variables are equal.
Intuitively, the cycle corresponding to the optimal dual solution x∗(I, p) indicates the trajectory
of states that the system goes through over time. In other words, given that the ordered set of strictly
positive dual variables is {x∗(I1, p1), x∗(I2, p2), . . . , x∗(Im, pm)}, we know that the system will cycle over
the states I1 → I2 → · · · → Im → I1 → · · · by the seller applying price pi in state Ii. Therefore, the
seller’s prices also follow a cyclic pattern p1, p2, . . . , pm, p1, p2, . . ., and so on. Similarly, the consumer’s
problem described in Section 4.2 can also be formulated as a linear program, and the dual problem
has an analogous interpretation.
We stress that the dual formulation is important because it is the strictly positive variables
at the dual solution that highlight the cycle of states. In the primal problem, such visualization is
not possible because the primal solution yields the value functions for each state. In contrast, it is
the binary nature of the dual solutions (either zero or strictly positive) that picks out the price and
inventory cycles.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1 Consider the following static game between the seller and the consumers.
The seller chooses a pricing strategy P (I) and consumers choose a purchasing strategy Dθ(I, p). We
omit the state space for brevity and write P and Dθ. The corresponding payoff functions (which are
functions of the above pricing and purchasing strategies) are the long-run average payoffs Π(P ;Dθ)
for the seller and Uθ(Dθ;P,D−θ) for the type-θ consumer. In this static game, a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium satisfies the conditions of our RE equilibrium in Definition 1. Therefore, it suffices to
demonstrate the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in our static game.
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We proceed by studying the payoff functions Π(P ;Dθ) for the seller and Uθ(Dθ;P,D−θ) for
the type-θ consumer. Consider first the seller. Given Dθ, the seller’s best response P ∗ that maximizes
Π(P ;Dθ) can be solved via dynamic programming as described in Section 4.1, so choosing the pricing
strategy P is equivalent to choosing the value functions g(I) and objective value λ. Thus, we may also
write the payoff function as Π(λ, g(I);Dθ). As we show in Appendix A, the seller’s dynamic program
is equivalent to the linear program (5)-(6). It is well known (see Rockafellar, 1970) that the optimal
objective value in the above program is equal to that in its Lagragian relaxation below:
min
λ,g(I)
λ +
∑
I
∑
p
L(I, p)[λ + g(I)− pD(I, p)− g(I′(I, p))], (11)
where L(I, p) are some Lagrange multipliers. Therefore, we may express the seller’s payoff function as
Π(λ, g(I);Dθ) = −
{
λ +
∑
I
∑
p
L(I, p)[λ + g(I)− pD(I, p)− g(I′(I, p))]
}
, (12)
which is linear in the seller’s strategy λ and g(I). Using the same argument, we can show that the
consumer’s payoff function is also linear in the consumer’s own strategy. Since the payoff functions are
linear and hence quasi-concave in each corresponding player’s own strategy, and the strategy spaces
are compact and convex, it then follows (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1994) that our static game has a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 2 This result follows from Lemma 1 and the derivations in Appendix A.
Proof of Lemma 1 By the flow balance constraint (8), the edges (I, p) with strictly positive weights
must form cycles. If there is more than one such cycle, we can redistribute the weights onto the single
cycle with maximal value, where the value of a cycle is defined by the sum
∑
pD̂(I, p)x(I, p) over edges
in that cycle. This implies that there must be an optimal dual solution with weights over a single
cycle. Finally, by flow balance, the weights over each edge along the cycle must be equal.
Proof of Proposition 1 (i) Suppose WTPf > WTPo. If the seller wishes to sell only to frequent
shoppers, it is clear that he will use EDHP as described. It remains to consider the case where the
seller wishes to sell to both types. In order to sell to occasional shoppers, there must be time periods
in which the price is WTPo or lower.
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We first show that the low price must be exactly WTPo. If it were lower, occasional shoppers
will still prefer to shop at their natural frequency (once every To periods), knowing that the seller will
prefer to offer a sale again whenever they run out of inventory (i.e. after To periods); thus, the seller
is worse off by lowering the sale price below WTPo.
Next, we show that the low prices WTPo are indeed offered once every To periods. If the time
between sales were longer, there would be time periods in which only frequent shoppers buy. If such
periods earned a higher average profit, the seller would prefer EDHP described above. Since the seller
does not prefer EDHP, such time periods (selling only to frequent shoppers) must earn a lower average
profit, and they can be eliminated by offering sales every To periods. Similarly, the interval can not
be shorter because occasional shoppers will not be willing to pay price WTPo at this more costly
shopping frequency.
Finally, we show that the price during all other periods must be WTPf . This holds because
only frequent shoppers are potential buyers and the seller will extract the entire surplus.
We have shown that the seller’s pricing strategy is the HILO strategy described in the propo-
sition. In this case, occasional shoppers buy only during a sale and they stock up for the entire To
periods. On the other hand, frequent shoppers purchase for z periods’ consumption during each sale,
and we determine z below. After z periods, they buy every period (only for current consumption)
until the next sale. To compute z, note that the frequent shopper’s cost in each price cycle, if he
stocks up for z periods during the sale, is(
Kf + z ·Rf ·WTPo +
hfRfz
2
2
)
+ (To − z) ·Rf · vf . (13)
The first term captures the cost to cover consumption for the z periods after the sale, and the remaining
terms are the cost to cover consumption for the remaining (To − z) periods until the next sale (this
latter cost must equal the entire consumption valuation since the seller captures all surplus). To
minimize cost, we equivalently minimize the following expression over z:(
Kf + z ·Rf · (WTPo −WTPf ) +
hfRfz
2
2
)
− z
√
2hfKfRf . (14)
The minimizer is
z∗ =
√
2Kf
hfRf
+
∆
hf
= 1 +
∆
hf
. (15)
Thus, during a sale, the frequent shopper stocks up for ∆/hf future periods (may be rounded up or
down), up to (To − 1) future periods, as stated in the proposition.
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(ii) Now, we consider the other case with WTPo > WTPf . If the seller wishes to sell to only
one consumer type, he will use EDHP as described and only occasional shoppers will buy at their
desired frequency. Next, if the seller wishes to sell to both types, there must be time periods in which
the price is at WTPf or lower. In any such period with the low price, suppose occasional shoppers
stock up for τo periods and frequent shoppers stock up for τf < τo periods. Then, during the τo − τf
periods in which only occasional shoppers still have inventory, the seller will optimally sell to frequent
shoppers at price WTPf (who buy every period). Thus, all consumption over these τo periods have
been purchased at prices not exceeding WTPf . The seller can simply use EDLP as described and
obtain at least as much profit. Under the constant price WTPf , frequent shoppers buy every period
and occasional shoppers buy once every To periods.
Proof of Corollary 1 From Proposition 1, when the seller wishes to sell to both types, the two
possible pricing formats are HILO and EDLP. If WTPf > WTPo, the former is more profitable;
otherwise, the latter is more profitable. When all other dimensions of heterogeneity are equal across
types, consumers with higher holding costs are the frequent shoppers. If they have sufficiently high
valuations (i.e. vf sufficiently large), the condition WTPf −WTPo > 0 holds and HILO is thus more
profitable. This shows (i), and a similar argument applies to (ii) and (iii).
Proof of Proposition 2 First, note that the optimal promotional depth is ∆ = (vf−vo)+
√
2hoKo
Ro
−√
2hf Kf
Rf
, which decreases as hf increases and ho decreases, but increases when Kf decreases and Ko
increases, as well as when Rf increases and Ro decreases. Next, note that the optimal time between
promotions is To =
√
2Ko
hoRo
, which increases as ho, Ro decreases and when Ko increases. A larger To
implies less frequent promotions.
Proof of Proposition 3 (i) The seller places an order at the start of each cycle to meet demand
from occasional shoppers who stock up. Suppose there are N orders within each cycle. These orders
must be evenly spaced since the holding cost incurred between consecutive orders is convex in the time
between consecutive orders. Therefore, their lengths τ1, . . . , τN may differ by at most one. Finally, the
candidate values for N must be the integers closest to To/Ts since these solutions generate inventory
cycle lengths that are closest to the EOQ solution Ts =
√
2Ks
hs·Mπf Rf , which minimizes cost.
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(ii) The seller places an order at the start of each cycle to meet demand from occasional
shoppers who stock up. If there are no further orders within each cycle, then we have the case with
N = 0. If there are further orders, this should occur only during the final S periods because there
is no demand before then. These additional orders help fulfill demand from frequent shoppers during
the final S periods, and the optimal structure of these orders follows from the same argument as in
part (i) above.
Proof of Proposition 4 (i) It suffices to show that the holding costs incurred due to limited
production capacity is higher under HILO compared to EDHP. Consider the units sold to frequent
shoppers under HILO. The holding costs incurred as a result of producing only these units already
exceed the holding costs under EDHP, since the latter faces the same demand quantity but at a
constant rate. Thus, the total holding costs under HILO must be even higher.
(ii) Now, we need to show that holding costs incurred due to limited production capacity is
higher under EDLP compared to EDHP. The same argument above applies.
Proof of Proposition 5 Consider the HILO pricing strategy with rationing where the availability
probability is ρ. If the frequent shopper does not wait for the sale, his average utility is zero since
the seller extracts all surplus. If he waits for the sale, he incurs fixed cost Kf and then there is a
probability ρ of stocking up for z periods and the remaining probability 1− ρ of earning zero. Thus,
the expected utility from waiting is
Ũf = −Kf + ρ
(
zRf · vf − zRf ·WTPo −
hfRfz
2
2
)
= −Kf + ρ
(
zRf · (vf −WTPo)−
hfRfz
2
2
)
= −Kf + ρ
(
zRf ·
(
∆ +
√
2hfKf
Rf
)
−
hfRfz
2
2
)
= −Kf + ρ
(
zhfRf ·
(
∆
hf
+
√
2Kf
hfRf
)
−
hfRfz
2
2
)
= −Kf + ρ ·
hfRf z̃
2
2
,
recalling from Proposition 1 that Tf =
√
2Kf
hf Rf
= 1 and the frequent shopper’s optimal choice of z
is z̃ = 1 + ∆/hf . Therefore, the shopper will not wait for the discount if and only if Ũf ≤ 0, or
equivalently, ρ ≤ 2Kfhf Rf
/
z̃2 = 1/z̃2 = ρ̃, where ρ̃ = 1
/(
1 + ∆hf
)2
as given in the proposition.
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To maximize profit, the seller will not use any ρ < ρ̃ (since this only reduces sales to occasional
shoppers) and will also not use any ρ ∈ (ρ̃, 1) (since frequent shoppers will wait anyway, it is more
profitable with ρ = 1). Notice also that EDHP is dominated by HILO with ρ = ρ̃ described above.
Therefore, to maximize profit, the seller always uses HILO and chooses between ρ = 1 (no rationing)
and ρ = ρ̃. Finally, observe that using ρ = 1 yields some consumer surplus to frequent shoppers
(when they stock up during the promotion) while using ρ = ρ̃ allows the seller to capture all surplus
from frequent shoppers. On the other hand, using ρ = 1 sells to all occasional shoppers while using
ρ = ρ̃ sells only to some of them. Therefore, using ρ = ρ̃ is preferred when the proportion of frequent
shoppers is large, or equivalently, when the proportion of occasional shoppers is small.
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